The British Public's Perception of Immigration and Immigrants

How does the public view immigration in general?

To understand how the public really viewed immigration, our research asked respondents whether they felt ‘immigration is a good thing or a bad thing for Britain?’. On the surface, the public is split evenly into thirds, with 33% viewing immigration as ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ for Britain, 31% believing immigration to be ‘good’ or ‘very good’ for Britain, and 30% feeling it is ‘neither bad nor good’ (figure 1.1.1).

This general perception of immigration appears to correlate strongly with political affiliation to the major parties.

For example, with those who said they voted Labour in 2019 had a discernibly more positive view of immigration than their Conservative voting counterparts (figure 1.1.2). Whilst almost half (48%) of respondents who said they previously voted for Labour viewed immigration positively, less than a fifth (19%) of those who said they voted Conservative felt the same. Respondents who said they voted Conservative in the last election had a decidedly more negative perception of immigration, with just 2% of these respondents feeling immigration is a ‘very good’ thing for Britain, and more than a quarter (28%) feeling it’s a ‘very bad’ thing.

How does the public view the current level of immigration?

As well as asking for general views on whether immigration is a ‘good thing or a bad thing’ for Britain, we also asked for perspectives on whether ‘the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays should be increased, reduced or remain the same’ to help capture a range of feelings and beliefs (figure 1.2.1).

Overall, 52% of respondents thought immigration should be reduced, of whom 71% believed it should be reduced ‘a lot’.

In contrast, only 14% of respondents thought immigration should be increased. This means, that while our research finds the public still supports a reduction in immigration overall, (continuing a long-term trend in public opinion), they do so to a lesser extent than in 2011.

Having a positive view of immigration, however, does not always appear to translate into a desire for numbers to increase (figure 1.2.2). Whilst those who saw immigration as a ‘very bad thing’ for Britain overwhelmingly favour reducing immigration by ‘a lot’ (84%), the views of those who see immigration as a ‘very good thing’ are more divided.

One in five (21%) of this group favours a reduction in immigration, whereas just under half (47%) favour an increase. Those who viewed immigration more positively are also more likely to be neutral with how they perceive current levels of immigration. For example, just over two in five (42%) of those viewing immigration as a ‘good thing’ wanted ‘the number of immigrants coming to Britain nowadays’ to ‘remain the same’, while fewer than one in ten (8%) of those viewing immigration as a ‘bad thing’ felt the same.

When distinguishing by age group, older respondents were more likely to support a reduction in immigration and less likely to support an increase, relative to younger respondents (figure 1.2.3). Notably, respondents aged 65+ were nearly twice as likely (69%) as those aged 18-24 (37%), to favour lower immigration levels.

An even clearer trend emerged when differentiating by political affiliation. Compared with the 74% of respondents who said they voted Conservative in the 2019 General Election, only 37% of those who said they voted Labour and 34% of those who said they voted Liberal Democrat supported reduced immigration. These figures were roughly the same when comparing respondents who said they voted ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’ in the 2016 EU referendum.

Whilst just over half of respondents did favour a reduction in immigration, this figure is significantly lower than that observed in the Migration Observatory’s 2011 study (69%). The softening of immigration attitudes since Brexit has also been apparent in other survey data, as discussed in the Migration Observatory briefing on public attitudes towards immigration^[ii].

Recent research on the softening of anti-immigration attitudes after Brexit^[iii} argued that this could be related to the public’s perceptions that immigration control had been restored with Brexit, but also the result of people’s distancing from accusations of xenophobia that sometimes were linked to the Brexit debate.

The current political and social relevance of the cost-of-living crisis and the quality of healthcare which our research reveals are currently being perceived as more important than controlling immigration, might have also affected immigration attitudes more recently.

Section 2 of this report explores in detail the changing attitudes towards workers - including a high demand among the public for immigrants who work in shortage-occupations. This could also be a contributing factor to a change in public perceptions towards the current number of immigrants coming to Britain.

How does the British public view immigrants?

As part of our research, we asked participants to think about a typical immigrant. Namely, what groups of people they would ‘normally have in mind’ when they think about ‘immigrants’. Understanding the respondents’ mental images of immigrants is important, as this is likely to shape their beliefs and attitudes towards both immigration policy and immigration in general.

When thinking about immigrants, the public are most likely to have in mind ‘people coming to the UK to apply for refugee status’ (i.e asylum seekers), which was cited by around two thirds (65%) of respondents (figure 1.3.1). The public were less likely to have international students in mind; this group was cited by less than a fifth (19%) of respondents. Note that this research preceded the recent government announcements for changes to study visas, which may have since increased the salience of international students in the immigration debate. Immigrants were also discernibly less likely to be viewed as people who come to Britain to work (38%) or people who come to live with their spouse or partner (29%).

In contrast to the way UK statistics are recorded (which classifies anyone coming to the UK for more than a year as a long-term migrant), our respondents said they would normally have in mind people who come to Britain permanently (56%) when thinking of immigrants, rather than those who come to Britain temporarily (figure 1.3.2).

Older respondents such as those aged over 65 had a particularly defined view on the length of stay for immigrants, with over two thirds (69%) of this age group perceiving immigrants as people who come to Britain permanently, compared to 38% of their counterparts aged 18-24, who are more likely to have recognised immigrants as people coming to Britain temporarily.

While sizable majorities of respondents who said they were voters for both major parties in 2019 shared a perception of immigrants as people who come to the UK to seek asylum (64% of those who said they voted Labour, and 77% of those who said they voted Conservative in 2019), a clearer divide existed between different age groups. Older respondents appeared to have a more homogeneous perception of immigrants than younger ones. The perception that immigrants are people who come to the UK to apply for refugee status was noticeably less prevalent in younger age groups for example. While over three quarters (77%) of those aged 65+ had asylum seekers in mind, just under half (49%) of those aged 25-34, and just over half (51%) of those 18-24 viewed immigrants as people who come to Britain to apply for refugee status.

Peoples’ mental images of immigrants are influenced by multiple factors, including the political discourses around immigration, their personal attitudes and political orientations, as well as their social context and contacts. Intriguingly, public perceptions of immigrants do not align well with actual data on reasons for migration to the UK from the ONS statistics on long-term immigration^[iv].

Whilst the public were least likely to have students in mind when thinking about immigrants, they were the largest group of migrants in official migration figures for the year ending March 2023: 40% of non-UK nationals who moved long-term to the UK in 2022 did so for study reasons. A similar mismatch is true when it comes to asylum seekers. Asylum seekers only represented 6% of total long-term immigration in the year ending March 2023, although this share would be 21% if we also include resettled refugees, and people coming under the bespoke schemes for Ukrainians and BNO(s), British National Overseas (such as Hong Kong residents). However, 65% of respondents thought that immigrants are mostly people who come to the UK to seek asylum.

As part of our aim to understand perceptions of immigration and immigrants, we gave respondents the chance to write-in up to five countries where they think immigrants come to Britain from (figure 1.3.3). Whilst perceptions appear diverse, both recent media influence and long-term migrant populations appear to shape perceptions. Between them, for example, Afghanistan (13%) and Ukraine (11%) represent almost a quarter of all mentions, highlighting the potential importance of recent media coverage of immigration from these countries in shaping perceptions. This may also reflect the prominence of Syria (7% of countries cited). Other frequently mentioned countries are reflective of the largest migrant communities in the UK. For example, India represents the largest non-UK born group in England and Wales (920,000 in the last Census[i]) and was the third most cited country (8%), closely followed by other countries with large populations in the UK including Poland (7%) and Pakistan (7%). Interestingly though, Western European countries with sizeable UK populations such as Italy, the Republic of Ireland and Germany received comparatively few mentions.

How have public perceptions changed since 2011?

Do respondents’ perceptions of the typical immigrant reflect recent prominent debates among politicians and in the media about ‘small boats’? On the one hand, when we compared our new research to the same questions asked in 2011, perceptions of the typical immigrant appear to have narrowed, with the public now less likely to view immigrants as coming to Britain for any reason other than to seek asylum (figure 1.4.1). The proportion of the public who view immigrants as people coming to Britain to work, for example, is 24 points lower than in 2011 (28% vs 52%), and 10 points lower (19% vs 29%) for people who come to Britain to study. The same trend is true for perceptions around how long immigrants stay in Britain. For example, temporary durations, where people stay in Britain for less than a year, had dropped to 11% compared to 15% of respondents considering this in 2011. And for those staying in Britain for between one and five years, the number had dropped to 18% in 2023, compared to 27% of respondents viewing this as a likely duration to stay in Britain in 2011.

Crucially though, it is worth remembering that the public already appeared to view immigrants primarily as being asylum seekers long before the recent political and media focus on ‘small boats’. In 2011 three out of five respondents viewed immigrants as being people who come to Britain to seek asylum (62%), with the figure in 2023 at 65% being similar.

Our research findings therefore, highlight that recent coverage of people arriving in ‘small boats’ is probably not the core reason that many of the public have asylum seekers in mind when they think of immigrants.

While recent debates may have helped to further entrench this perception, similar findings emerged from the data in 2011 when the number of asylum seekers in the UK was much lower and ‘small boat’ arrivals were not a feature of public debate.